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PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Intervenor-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 17622 
This is an action arising from an automobile collision 
in July of 1977 between plaintiff and defendant, an uninsured 
motorist. The present appeal concerns the right of Plain-
tiff's insurance carrier to intervene as a party defendant 
pursuant to its uninsured motorist coverage. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The present litigation was initiated in April of 1979. 
Subsequently, a partial summary judgment was obtained 
against the defendant by the plaintiff based upon Defendant's 
affidavit. Appellant Prudential Property and Casualty 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Insurance Company moved to intervene in the remaining 
litigation concerning damages. This motion was denied 
by the lower court. 
An application for interlocutory appeal was filed 
with this Court and was granted on April 2, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court allowing it 
to intervene in the lower court litigation as a party 
defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no dispute concerning the statement of facts 
in this litigation. On or about July 14, 1977, the plain-
tiff and Defendant were involved in an automobile collision 
in Eden, Utah. The plaintiff Barbara Lima filed her com-
plaint against defendant Earl Chambers on April 3, 1979. 
(R. 1-2). Defendant Chambers who is uninsured obtained 
the services of an attorney and filed an answer on April 25, 
1979. (R. 3). 
On May 11, 1979, Plaintiff filed her first set of 
interrogatories to be answered by Defendant. (R. 4-11). 
These interrogatories went unanswered until the plaintiff 
filed a motion to compel answers to interrogatories on 
November 27, 1979. (R. 13). Plaintiff's motion was set 
for hearing on December 5, 1979, and the court made a minute 
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entry indicating that the defendant was not present in 
person nor through counsel at the hearing. A stipulation 
was subsequently entered into between counsel for the 
parties where the defendant agreed to appear at the 
office of the plaintiff's attorney to answer the interroga-
tories. (R. 15). 
On February 12, 1980, Defendant's attorney withdrew 
from the case. (R. 16). The following day, February 13, 
1980, Defendant executed an affidavit prepared on the 
letterhead of Plaintiff's attorney stating among other 
things that he was driving a 1966 Ford pickup truck and 
that "I caused said vehicle to collide into the vehicle 
being operated by Barbara Lima .... " (R. 17-18). 
On September 18, 1980, Plaintiff moved for partial 
summary judgment as to liability alone upon the basis that 
Defendant himself had admitted that he had caused the 
accident. (R. 21). On October 21, 1980, the lower court 
granted the motion stating "It appears from Defendant's 
affidavit that he agrees he is the cause of the accident, 
and by filing said affidavit he appears he agrees partial 
summary judgment should be granted." (R. 22). Accordingly, 
an order granting partial summary judgment was entered. 
(R. 23). 
On January 12, 1981, Prudential Property & Casualty 
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Insurance Company, the insurance carrier of the plaintiff 
providing uninsured motorist coverage, moved to intervene 
in the litigation as a party defendant. It claimed that 
because defendant Earl Chambers was not represented by 
counsel the interests of the insurance carrier were not 
properly represented. (R. 29). 
On February 18, 1981, the motion to intervene was 
denied; (R. 36). An order was subsequently entered. 
(R. 37). 
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company 
filed an application for interlocutory appeal. This 
Court entered an order granting the application. (R. 38). 
ARGUMENT 
IN UNINSURED MOTORIST LITIGATION, THE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF THE PLAINTIFF HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO INTERVENE FOR ITS OWN 
PROTECTION AND TO PREVENT MANIFEST INJUSTICE. 
This court's previous decisions forbidding the 
uninsured motorist carrier to intervene as a 
party should be overruled. 
On three separate occasions this Court in split 
decisions has addressed various questions of uninsured 
motorist representation. In Christensen v. Peterson, 25 
Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 (1971), the plaintiff sued the 
tortfeasor (an uninsured motorist) and his own insurance 
carrier. The trial court held that the insurance carrier 
could not be joined as a party in the case and dismissed 
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the complaint as to it. On appeal, this Court affirmed 
with Justice Ellett dissenting. 
In Kesler v. Tate, 28 Utah 2d 355, 502 P.2d 565 (1972) 
the insurer for the plaintiff sought to intervene since 
the action was against an uninsured motorist and the 
insured desired to have its day in court and not be com-
pelled to pay a judgment against it without a chance to 
be heard. The uninsured motorist in the case was repre-
sented by his own counsel. Again, this Court stated the 
Christensen case was dispositive and sustained the trial 
court in refusing to permit the intervention by the 
insurer. Justice Ellett and Justice Crockett dissented 
in that case. 
Finally, in Wright v. Brown, 574 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1978), 
an action was brought to recover against plaintiff's auto-
mobile insurer for injuries sustained when plaintiff was 
struck from the rear by a vehicle driven by an uninsured 
motorist. The uninsured motorist and the insurer of the 
driver were joined as third-party defendants. The insurers 
were granted summary judgment and the lower court entered 
default against the uninsured motorist. The insurance 
carrier appealed from the default judgment and garnishment 
which sought satisfaction of the judgment. This Court held 
that the insurer lacked standing to appeal from the default 
-5-
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judgment in that it was not a party to the action. Again, 
Justice Ellett and Justice Crockett dissented. 
As can be seen, therefore, the judicial history of 
litigation involving the rights of uninsured motorist 
carriers has been one involving a divided court. Appellant 
submits that it is now time to "alter the course of the law 
as set forth in Christensen v. Peterson and Kesler v. Tate," 
quoted from Brown, (574 P.2d at 1155) and to allow an 
uninsured motorist carrier to intervene in ·the litigation 
between the insured and the uninsured motorist. 
The reasons for allowing intervention are that 
the failure to allow intervention is unconstitutional and 
Rule 24, U.R.C.P., requires intervention be allowed. 
1. Failure to allow intervention of an uninsured 
carrier is unconstitutional. 
It appears that an insurance carrier is bound by the 
judgment entered against an uninsured motorist which has 
been obtained by the carrier's insured. Schippers v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 518 P.2d 1099 (Utah 
1974); Vernon Fire & Casualty Insurance Company v. Metney, 
351 N.E.2d 60 (Ct. App. Ind. 1976); State Ex Rel Manchester 
Insurance & Indemnity Co. v. Moss, 522 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1975). 
Appellant adopts the argument raised by Justice Ellett 
in his dissenting opinion in the Kesler case in support of 
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its position that the failure to allow intervention is a 
denial of due process if the carrier is bound by the 
previously obtained judgment. Justice Ellett stated the 
following: 
If it be assumed that the insurer will be 
bound by the judgment rendered in the case in 
which it has had no opportunity to be heard, 
then there would be a denial of due process of 
law, for the gist of due process of law is the 
right to have a course of legal proceedings 
according to those rules and principles which 
have been established in our system of juris-
prudence for the enforcement and protection 
of private rights. 
Under our system of law there must be a 
competent court to pass upon the subject matter 
of the dispute; and where that involves the 
personal liability of a defendant, the defendant 
must be brought within the jurisdiction of the 
court and be afforded the right to be present 
in court; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise; 
to have the right to cross-examine each and every 
witness for the opposition; and to offer such 
evidence as it may care to present to the court. 
502 P.2d at 567. 
The failure to allow appellant to intervene as a 
party defendant in this litigation clearly denies it due 
process of law as is required under Article I, Section 7, 
of the Utah Constitution. In effect, the procedure pro-
hibiting intervention allows a plaintiff and an uninsured 
motorist to conspire to obtain a judgment which is legally 
binding upon the insurance carrier. To prohibit the 
carrier from asserting any type of defense throughout 
the proceedings clearly violates the carrier's due process 
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rights. 
In the instant case, for example, the order granting 
partial summary judgment was based upon the affidavit 
submitted by the defendant Chambers but prepared entirely 
by Plaintiff's own attorney. Unless Appellant is allowed 
to intervene in the litigation involving damages, it is 
just as likely that Defendant will not contest the claim 
of Plaintiff concerning the amount of damages and there-
fore Plaintiff will be given free rein to basically ask 
for any amount of damages which will be completely unrefuted 
and untested. 
Due process dictates that Appellant be given an oppor-
tunity to challenge the evidence of damages presented by 
Plaintiff in order to insure that a judgment has been 
obtained in a fair and just proceeding in which all parties 
are adequately represented. If, on the other hand, this 
Court were to rule that an uninsured motorist carrier is 
not bound by a judgment against the uninsured, then the 
principle of judicial economy is violated since the 
Plaintiff will have the "unnecessary expense of two law-
suits instead of one even though the identical issues 
will be raised in the second action as are litigated in 
the first." Kesler, supra, 502 P.2d 567 (Justice Ellett 
dissenting). See also Vernon Fire & Casualty v. Metney, 
-8-
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351 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. 1976); Heisner v. Jones, 169 N.W.2d 
606 (Neb. 1969). 
2. Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires 
that intervention be allowed. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action when "the representation of the 
applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be 
inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a 
judgment in the action." 
It cannot seriously be disputed that there is no 
representation of the defendant in this case. The defendant 
has no attorney, has indicated no intention of obtaining 
one, and has even signed an affidavit prepared by Plaintiff's 
attorney admitting full liability of the accident. Like-
wise, as previously noted, the insurance carrier in this case 
is probably bound by any judgment obtained against the 
uninsured motorist Chambers. For these reasons, therefore, 
it is evident that the criteria of Rule 24, has been met. 
This Court has noted that the purpose of Rule 24 is 
to allow a person to intervene who is not a named party 
but who has often a greater interest in the subject matter 
of the litigation than either the plaintiff or the defendant. 
Commercial Block Realty v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
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Co., 28 P. 2d 1081 (Utah 1934). 
While normally an insurance carrier does not wish to 
become a party to the litigation because of the prejudicial 
effect its entry could have upon a jury, as noted by 
Justice Crockett in his dissenting opinion in Kesler, 
it is for the insurance carrier to determine whether it 
wishes to enter its appearance and should it so determine 
the court should allow its entry into the litigation as 
a "real party in interest." 
Courts in other jurisdictions have held under similar 
intervention statutes that the insurance carrier of uninsured 
motorist coverage has a vested right to intervene in the 
main action. In Wert v. Burke, 197 N.E.2d 717 (App. Ill. 
1964) the Illinois court held that an uninsured motorist 
carrier clearly was entitled to intervene in the main 
action since its interests could never be "adequately" 
protected. The court in defining "adequate" stated the 
following: 
The word "adequate" and its broad usage 
is indicated by its definition as applicable 
to the case before us. It is defined as 
"legally sufficient; such as is lawfully and 
reasonably sufficient; ... an adequate remedy." 
(Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd 
Edition). Certainly no reasonable man, con-
fronted with the same situation as that of the 
petitioning intervenor, would rely on the 
defendant and their lawyers for the represen-
tation of his interest. Id. at 719. 
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-In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Giles, 154 S.E.2d 286 (C. App. Ga. 1967), the court there 
allowed intervention under a similar intervention statute 
stating "the insurer does have a direct and immediate 
interest to protect in this kind of action, and it stands 
to lose or gain by the direct effect of the judgment." 
Id. at 288. See also Rawlins v. Stanley, 586 P.2d 840 
(Kan. 1971). 
Since the essential criteria for allowing intervention 
under Rule 24 is clearly present in this case and all 
cases involving uninsured motorists it was erroneous for 
the lower court to deny Appellant's motion for intervention 
and this Court should remand the matter to allow Appellant 
the right to become a party defendant in this action. 
CONCLUSION 
This case represents a classic example as to when 
intervention should be allowed. Here, Utah law requires 
that the appellant insurance carrier provide uninsured 
motorists to all covered drivers. Section 41-12-21.1, 
U.C.A. Since the plaintiff is anxious to recover a collect-
able judgment and since the defendant is anxious for the 
plaintiff to be fully satisfied there is no adverse environ-
ment in which to litigate the issue as to liability and 
damages. Both the plaintiff and the defendant are interested 
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in obtaining a judgment so that the uninsured motorist 
carrier will be liable. 
Unless the uninsured motorist carrier is given the 
right to intervene in the main litigation the carrier is 
clearly denied a due process right since it is held liable 
to a judgment without the opportunity of defending itself. 
If such judgment, on the other hand, is not considered 
res judicata against the insurance carrier then it would 
be necessary for the insured to relitigate the exact issues, 
facts, and other circumstances in a subsequent trial 
thereby causing a needless waste of judicial time and 
subjecting the insured to double expenses. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was clearly 
designed to allow a procedure in which a party who has 
a substantial interest in the litigation and whose interest 
is not being protected by the litigants may intervene in 
order to have his day in court. To allow the appellant 
to become an intervenor and named as a party defendant will 
insure that the evidence presented by the plaintiff is 
subject to all the rigors of cross-examination and will 
protect the validity of the judgment against any claim of 
fraud or collusion with the uninsured motorist. 
This Court's previous decisions did not address the 
constitutional and statutory issues now raised in this 
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appeal. In addition, the fact that the uninsured motorists 
in those cases were represented by private counsel created 
a less compelling reason for intervention. However, because 
these decisions were decided by a bare majority and because 
the facts in this case clearly show the abuse that can 
occur, intervention in uninsured motorist cases should now 
be allowed and "all prior cases holding to the contrary 
should be overruled." Wright v. Brown, 574 P.2d at 1156 
(Justice Ellett dissenting) . 
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court's 
order denying intervention is erroneous and this Court 
should remand the matter to the lower court with directions 
that Appellant be named as a party defendant and be allowed 
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